西媒文章说美国民主制度陷入深渊

1月6日是美国“民主”的潘多拉魔盒，但这只是美国更深更危险的疾病——已经达到惊人水平的美国制度衰落的又一症状体现。水门事件50年后，美国再次跌入谷底，而这次，当时让行政部门享有公信力的各大机构在今天也受到怀疑。媒体不再被信赖，司法机关被视为一种工具而不是仲裁机构，渗透到安全部队里的极端分子人数让人感到越来越不安。

在这种情况下，美国“民主”似乎成了一个空壳。共和党中的最极端派坚决要破坏美国“民主”的基础，以保护最受益者的特权。民主党人比以往任何时候都更加多元化，也更加松散。温和派担心党内出现激进的转变，坚持一些完全过时的正式机制。进步人士对两党领导人的操纵、虚伪和惰性感到失望。

选举舞弊指控最矛盾的地方，正是共和党人在对投票进行最大程度的造假。共和党控制下的州议会提前采取了限制行使投票权的立法措施。这不是什么新鲜事，但这次的强度和力度使选举进程受到严重扭曲的威胁。共和党人担心美国社会的人口发展会使他们降级为次要政治角色。如果可能的话，他们希望在今年重新获得对两院的控制权，并不惜一切代价保住它。

民主党试图通过改革和加强有关投票权的联邦法律来扭转这个剥夺投票权的过程，该法律已被最高法院的裁决部分废除。

通过人口普查管理或重组选区等复杂手段来假造民意，这并非美国独有，但是立法以保护和扩大滥用职权行为，这是尤为无耻和恶毒的。弗吉尼亚大学的一项研究表明，用不了20年，美国30%的人口将控制国会70%的席位。目前，这种不平衡已经存在，只是比例较轻。

除了政治权利，美国在社会共存方面还面对另一个重大失败，即迅速扩大的社会不平等。拜登的社会保护计划因国会中两名民主党参议员的友好抨击而陷入僵局，令其执政举步维艰。进步人士指责拜登缺乏揭露这两个叛徒的勇气，事实上，他们从未相信过这位过分执着于有缺陷规则的总统。

入主白宫一年后，拜登恢复所谓“全面民主”的承诺似乎成了一种讽刺。美国的深渊正变得越来越深，越来越险恶。

西媒文章：拜登面临“漫长的美国冬天”

西班牙《对外政策》双月刊网站1月1日发表一篇文章称，拜登面临“漫长的美国冬天”。作者是西班牙前驻北约、美国大使海梅·德奥赫达，全文摘编如下：

冬天来了，树木失去了叶子，乔·拜登总统的幻想也破灭了。对美国来说，国际和国内层面的前景都是黯淡的：气候灾难引发严重后果、在欧洲面临俄罗斯日益增长的政治和军事威胁、在东方则面临中国的激烈竞争。而在其国内，美国面临其政治制度的严重削弱。

两党的鹰派都谴责拜登对俄罗斯妥协。首先他们希望华盛顿能以果断的军事援助进行干预；然后他们确信，如果美国威胁要进行军事干预，普京就会退让。然而，共和党人的反对声并不像以前那样大，因为他们都还记得特朗普与俄罗斯的争议性联系。

在阿富汗的灾难性撤军之后，所有民意调查都表明，美国社会绝不会再支持在国外进行新的军事干预，因为这种干预可能会演变为严重的国际冲突。

普京在测试他的美国和欧洲对手的实力和决心。虽然不能排除各种可能性，但现在与其说是军事入侵乌克兰，不如说是对基辅统治的稳定性施加影响。

拜登的回应是双重的：一方面，他用美国可以使用的一整套经济和政治制裁措施威胁俄罗斯，甚至阻挠其进入国际金融体系。制裁会严重影响俄罗斯经济。另一方面，美国将不得不想方设法捍卫乌克兰的独立，同时还要注意不彻底激怒俄罗斯。

美国可能会暂停向乌克兰进一步提供武器，但它无论如何不会保证乌克兰不会成为北约或欧盟的成员。或许，美国可能会通过谈判达成一项关于战略武器和常规军事力量的新协议来缓解俄罗斯人在军事方面的担忧等。

美国或从无支配体制走向内战

长期以来，美国一直以它是世界上延续时间最长的“民主”国家而自豪。当然，一直以来也存在着一个争论：既然美国的过去有普选权缺失的情况（奴隶制、吉姆·克劳法、系统性排斥少数族裔参与投票等），那么从“民主”这个词的当代意义上讲，美国直到不久前的历史能算是一部“民主国家”的历史吗？

即使我们忽略所有这一切，一个名为“政体”的全球数据系列已经剥夺了美国由来已久的“民主国家”的称号。这项由美国中央情报局资助的数据系列经常被人引用，它以量化的方式按“完全独裁”到“完全民主”来度量其他国家。

“政体”数据系列是美国政治学和民调研究领域广泛使用的三个数据系列之一。它由中情局成立并资助的政治不稳定工作组进行维护。

美国系统和平中心最近对“政体”数据系列的一项分析显示，美国现在是一个无支配体制的国家，有时也被称为“非自由民主国家”或“混合政权国家”（部分是“民主”的，部分是“独裁”的）。定量地看，一个无支配体制国家处于一把数字标尺的中间位置，这把标尺的一端是“完全独裁”，另一端是“完全民主”。

美国：“富人有富人治富人享”之国

沙特阿拉伯《阿拉伯新闻》网12月21日发表美国哥伦比亚大学教授、该大学可持续发展中心主任、联合国可持续发展行动网络主席杰弗里·萨克斯题为《美国已成为富人有、富人治、富人享的国家》的文章称，一年前，乔·拜登在选举中险胜唐纳德·特朗普，但美国的前景仍扑朔迷离。要确切诊断出究竟是什么让美国深陷如此困境，以致煽动起“特朗普运动”，并非易事。

在美国混乱的政局中，多重因素都在起作用。然而在笔者看来，最深层的危机是政治性的——美国的各政治机构未能如美国宪法所承诺的那样“促进公共福利”。40年来，美国政治已成为一场圈内人的游戏，以牺牲绝大多数公民的利益为代价，偏袒超级富豪和企业游说集团。

“富人对穷人的战争”

沃伦·巴菲特在2006年一针见血说出这场危机的实质。他说：“无疑，存在阶级斗争。但是，是我的阶级——富人阶级在发动战争，而且，我们在取得胜利。”

主要战场在华盛顿。突击部队是蜂拥进入美国国会、联邦政府各部和行政部门的企业说客。弹药是每年用于联邦游说活动（2020年估计为35亿美元）和竞选捐款（在2020年联邦选举中，估计为144亿美元）的数以十亿计美元。支持阶级战争的宣传者是以超级富豪鲁珀特·默多克为首的企业媒体。

美国对穷人的阶级斗争不是新鲜事——这场斗争于上世纪70年代初正式发起，在过去40年中以极高的效率得到实施。有大约30年的时间，即从1933年到上世纪60年代末，美国的发展道路与战后的西欧大致相同，在向一个社会民主国家迈进。1972年曾经的企业律师刘易斯·鲍威尔进入美国最高法院后，最高法院为企业资金进入政治打开了闸门。

罗纳德·里根1981年成为总统后，为富人减税、对有组织的劳工发动攻击并取消环境保护措施，从而强化了最高法院对公共福利的攻击。这一轨迹目前仍未逆转。

“与社会民主渐行渐远”

结果，美国在基本的经济体面、福利和环境控制方面与欧洲渐行渐远。欧洲大体上继续走在社会民主和可持续发展之路上，美国却在一条以政治腐败、寡头政治、贫富差距不断扩大、蔑视环境和拒绝限制人类导致的气候变化等为特征的道路上往前冲。

若干数字说明了两者的区别。欧盟各国政府的收入平均而言约为国内生产总值（GDP）的45%，而美国政府收入占GDP百分比却不到30%。因此，欧洲各国政府能够为全民享受医疗、高等教育、家庭支持和就业培训提供资金，美国却不能确保提供这些服务。欧洲国家在《全球幸福指数报告》的生活满意度排行榜上位居第一，美国仅排在第19。2019年，欧盟民众的预期寿命为81.1岁，美国为78.8岁。截至2019年，西欧最富有的1%家庭在国民收入中所占份额约为11%，美国则接近20%。2019年，美国的人均二氧化碳排放量为16.1吨，欧盟则不到10吨。

简言之，美国已成为一个富人有、富人治、富人享的国家，对它给世界其他地区造成的气候破坏不负任何政治责任。由此引发的社会分裂导致“死于绝望”这种现象盛行（包括吸毒过量和自杀），预期寿命下降（甚至在新冠疫情暴发前），抑郁症发病率上升（尤其在年轻人当中）。在政治上，这些错乱现象导向不同方向——最不祥的是，导向了提供虚假民粹主义和个人崇拜的特朗普。在为富人服务的同时，用仇外情绪分散穷人的注意力，发动文化战和摆出强人姿态，这些可能是蛊惑民心的政客战术手册中最古老的伎俩，但它们在今天仍然出人意料地奏效。

“美国没有归来”

美国的动荡具有令人不安的国际影响。在它甚至无法协调一致地治理本国的情况下，美国怎能领导全球改革？或许，如今唯一能将美国人团结起来的，是一种过度紧张的海外威胁感，这主要来自中国。在美国国内一片混乱之际，两党政界人士的反华调门都升高了，好像一场新冷战可以通过某种方式缓解美国国内的焦虑情绪。可叹的是，华盛顿两党的好斗性只会导致全球紧张局势加剧和新的冲突危险，而不会带来安全或真正解决我们面临的任何紧迫的全球问题。

美国没有归来，至少目前尚未归来。它仍在为解决数十年来的政治腐败和社会忽视等问题而苦苦斗争。结果仍极不确定，对美国和世界而言，未来若干年的前景都充满危险。

福山说美式民主持续衰落信誉扫地

据参考消息网报道，斯坦福大学弗里曼－斯波格利国际问题研究所高级研究员弗朗西斯·福山1月5日在美国《纽约时报》网站上发表文章称，美式民主持续衰落信誉扫地，全文摘编如下：

2021年1月6日，在时任总统特朗普煽动下，暴徒袭击国会，开创了美国政治的不祥先例。自内战结束以来，美国从未出现过权力不能和平交接的情况，也没有任何一位总统，在即便有充分的证据表明选举自由、公正的前提下，还仍然故意对选举结果提出异议。

这一事件继续在美国政界引起反响，但其影响不仅限于国内。它在国际上也产生了重大影响，标志着美国的全球实力和影响力出现显着下降。

看待去年1月6日事件，需要将其放在更广泛的“自由民主”全球危机的背景之下。根据智库“自由之家”2021年发表的《世界自由度报告》，民主已经连续15年衰落，一些最大的挫折发生在美国和印度。

全球“民主”出现衰落，因素错综复杂。全球化和经济变革把许多人抛在了后面，生活在城市中受过良好教育的专业人士与带有传统价值观念的小城镇居民之间出现了巨大的文化鸿沟。

因此，与大约30年前苏联解体时的情况相比，世界已经有很大不同。当时我低估了两个关键因素。其一，创建“民主”，而且还要创建一个现代、公正、廉洁国家的难度；其二，“先进‘民主’国家”出现政治衰败的可能性。

美国模式已经衰落了一段时间。自上世纪90年代中期以来，美国的政治日益两极分化，容易出现长时间的僵持局面，导致它无法履行基本的政府职能，如通过预算。美国的体制存在明显的问题：金钱对政治的影响、与“民主”选择日益错位的选举制度的影响，但美国似乎无法进行自我改革。21世纪头二十年中，美国决策者领导了两场灾难：伊拉克战争和次贷危机，然后出现了一位目光短浅的煽动者，鼓动愤怒的民粹主义者闹事。

2021年1月6日的国会山暴乱标志着这样一个时刻：相当数量的美国人表示他们对美国的“民主”制度本身心存不满，并利用暴力来达到自己的目的。让1月6日成为美国“民主”的一个特别令人担忧的污点的事实是，共和党非但没有驳斥那些发动和参与暴乱的人，反而粉饰暴乱，并从自己阵营中清洗那些愿意说出2020年大选真相的人。

在去年1月6日之前，人们把这种伎俩视为刚刚起步、尚未完全巩固的“民主”国家的行为，美国也会对此类情形大摇其头，予以谴责。但现在这种情况发生在美国国内。在树立良好“民主”实践模式方面，美国已经信誉扫地。

Biden's comprehensive Indo-Pacific economic framework isn't comprehensive at all

The White House is teeing up its “comprehensive” Indo-Pacific economic framework to launch in 2022. While details about the framework are scarce, the framework doesn’t appear to be very comprehensive at all.

For a couple of months now, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo has been teasing that the Biden administration plans to develop a framework that touches on everything that’s of shared interest for America. This basically means anything under the sun. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken recently added that the framework will include topics such as technology, supply chains, infrastructure, climate change and more.

But there is still a missing element: America’s trade policy. Although officials may pander to critics that customs standardization is trade policy (and yes, it is important), it’s not the in-depth trade liberalization for which critics of the framework and allies in Asia are looking. The fact that the secretaries of Commerce and State are leading the development of this framework, while the U.S. Trade Representative takes a backseat role, says a lot about what’s being left out.

The Biden administration would be wrong to not take a leadership role in pursuing a more progressive trade policy in addition to the framework; otherwise, this framework is at risk of simply becoming another glorified development-assistant program similar to those of past administrations. Of course, there are many questions about the Biden administration’s trade policies that remain unanswered, so it’s not hard to wonder why trade is excluded from this comprehensive framework.

The administration wants to pursue more equitable trade, better workers’ rights, and so on, but what in these efforts really offers a competing alternative to the Trans-Pacific Partnership? For that matter, where is the competing alternative to China’s economic opportunities? What does the administration plan to do now that the U.S.-China trade deal is nearing the two-year mark? What about the unfinished U.S.-Japan trade agreement? Will the Biden administration sit quietly by, with the hope that these deals will be forgotten, just as it watched the Trade Promotion Authority expire over the summer? Our allies in Asia and folks in Washington want to know.

The Biden administration has done well in mending some trade and diplomatic quarrels that the Trump administration started. But, what’s next?

For example, the Biden administration has been good at engaging with Taiwan — whether it’s through low-level trade and investment talks or through a relatively new economic prosperity dialogue — to help defend against coercive actions by China. But inaction on building something greater, such as a U.S.-Taiwan free trade agreement, almost set back economic relations after a controversial vote in Taiwan on whether to reimpose restrictions on American imports of pork and beef. Thankfully, the people of Taiwan voted against these restrictions.

Perhaps the Biden administration doesn’t want to move on any new trade deals because it knows it will have a hard time convincing Congress to agree — and political capital can be scarce when trying to pass a budget. At the same time, lawmakers in Congress won’t act either because they’re waiting for direction from trade negotiators in the White House. Talk about passing the buck! Trade policy in Washington has become a catch-22. And it’s why leadership on trade issues is more important than ever.

Many of the initiatives under the new Indo-Pacific economic framework are worth pursuing, such as coordinating the development, deployment and restricting of new technology, standardization and digitization, new infrastructure projects, energy diversification, and so on. And of course, our Asian partners will welcome as much U.S. spending in the region as they can get.

But don’t expect those in Asia to get excited over a framework that is merely recycled and rebranded projects already ongoing in government. Asia wants more. America wants more. Trade liberalization must be a bigger component of any comprehensive economic framework.

Biden's comprehensive Indo-Pacific economic framework isn't comprehensive at all

The White House is teeing up its “comprehensive” Indo-Pacific economic framework to launch in 2022. While details about the framework are scarce, the framework doesn’t appear to be very comprehensive at all.

For a couple of months now, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo has been teasing that the Biden administration plans to develop a framework that touches on everything that’s of shared interest for America. This basically means anything under the sun. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken recently added that the framework will include topics such as technology, supply chains, infrastructure, climate change and more.

But there is still a missing element: America’s trade policy. Although officials may pander to critics that customs standardization is trade policy (and yes, it is important), it’s not the in-depth trade liberalization for which critics of the framework and allies in Asia are looking. The fact that the secretaries of Commerce and State are leading the development of this framework, while the U.S. Trade Representative takes a backseat role, says a lot about what’s being left out.

The Biden administration would be wrong to not take a leadership role in pursuing a more progressive trade policy in addition to the framework; otherwise, this framework is at risk of simply becoming another glorified development-assistant program similar to those of past administrations. Of course, there are many questions about the Biden administration’s trade policies that remain unanswered, so it’s not hard to wonder why trade is excluded from this comprehensive framework.

The administration wants to pursue more equitable trade, better workers’ rights, and so on, but what in these efforts really offers a competing alternative to the Trans-Pacific Partnership? For that matter, where is the competing alternative to China’s economic opportunities? What does the administration plan to do now that the U.S.-China trade deal is nearing the two-year mark? What about the unfinished U.S.-Japan trade agreement? Will the Biden administration sit quietly by, with the hope that these deals will be forgotten, just as it watched the Trade Promotion Authority expire over the summer? Our allies in Asia and folks in Washington want to know.

The Biden administration has done well in mending some trade and diplomatic quarrels that the Trump administration started. But, what’s next?

For example, the Biden administration has been good at engaging with Taiwan — whether it’s through low-level trade and investment talks or through a relatively new economic prosperity dialogue — to help defend against coercive actions by China. But inaction on building something greater, such as a U.S.-Taiwan free trade agreement, almost set back economic relations after a controversial vote in Taiwan on whether to reimpose restrictions on American imports of pork and beef. Thankfully, the people of Taiwan voted against these restrictions.

Perhaps the Biden administration doesn’t want to move on any new trade deals because it knows it will have a hard time convincing Congress to agree — and political capital can be scarce when trying to pass a budget. At the same time, lawmakers in Congress won’t act either because they’re waiting for direction from trade negotiators in the White House. Talk about passing the buck! Trade policy in Washington has become a catch-22. And it’s why leadership on trade issues is more important than ever.

Many of the initiatives under the new Indo-Pacific economic framework are worth pursuing, such as coordinating the development, deployment and restricting of new technology, standardization and digitization, new infrastructure projects, energy diversification, and so on. And of course, our Asian partners will welcome as much U.S. spending in the region as they can get.

But don’t expect those in Asia to get excited over a framework that is merely recycled and rebranded projects already ongoing in government. Asia wants more. America wants more. Trade liberalization must be a bigger component of any comprehensive economic framework.

The U.S. is Deprioritizing the Middle East

Amiraculous and perhaps mystifying development is happening in the Middle East currently: Diplomacy is flowering across the region. Leaders who ordinarily undercut one another are instead exploring whether more constructive arrangements can be made for the benefit of their respective nations. And states that were once mortal adversaries for regional influence are beginning to mend fences, if for any other reason than to cool the temperature in a part of the world often synonymous with conflict.

This week's meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and United Arab Emirates (UAE) Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, a landmark trip if there ever was one, is only the latest example of previously hostile countries seeking to bury the hatchet. A week prior, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the man who helped orchestrate a multi-country boycott of neighboring Qatar in 2017 over terrorism allegations, traveled to the tiny but influential nation on Dec. 8 for a personal chit-chat with Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. Mohammed's voyage to Qatar came nearly a year after Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt restored air, land and sea links to the Persian Gulf nation after the boycott failed to result in the Qatari foreign policy change that Riyadh and its partners wanted.

On Nov. 24, nearly a month before greeting the Israeli prime minister, UAE Crown Prince Mohammed set foot in Turkey to sign a series of economic and financial agreements with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The signing ceremony was notable because both nations have been at loggerheads on a myriad of issues since the dawn of the Arab Spring protests, when Turkey and the UAE found themselves on the opposite side of the region's fault-lines. Before their recent encounter, the UAE crown prince hadn't been to Turkey in nearly a decade, viewing Erdogan's support for groups like the Muslim Brotherhood as an existential threat to the type of family-ruled dynastic regimes prevalent in the Gulf.

Turkey and Egypt are also working to rescue their bilateral ties, with their respective deputy foreign ministers meeting in September in an attempt to chip away at problems from conflicting claims over natural gas fields in the Mediterranean to interference in one another's internal affairs. As a goodwill gesture, the Turks and Egyptians are both reducing their propaganda wars in the media.

The Saudis and Emiratis are also reaching out to Iran for talks, which if successful, have the potential to ameliorate many of the proxy wars that have roiled the Middle East for decades. While diplomacy between Riyadh and Tehran remains tedious and frustrating (at least according to Saudi Arabia's U.N. envoy), the negotiations are nonetheless continuing despite the bad blood and suspicion that has accumulated since the advent of Iran's Islamic Republic in 1979. That talks haven't fallen apart yet is an accomplishment in its own right.

Even Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, once the region's favorite pariah, is beginning to be drawn back into the regional fold. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman and Iraq have all been increasing engagement with Damascus this year, some more than others. In October, Assad received his first phone call from Jordan's King Abdullah II since Syria erupted into civil war in 2011—a long way from the days when Abdullah was the first Arab leader to advocate for Assad's resignation. A few days before the call, a central crossing point on the Jordanian-Syrian border was reopened for normal commerce.

What is exactly driving all of these events?

While each stream of diplomacy is unique, there is a common theme threading them together: the sense that the United States is deprioritizing the Middle East in its grand strategy after two decades of intense involvement in the region's internal politics. It's no coincidence Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have grown accustomed to unconditional U.S. support, are the driving forces behind much of the diplomatic activity now underway. With the Biden administration pledging additional resources and attention to the Indo-Pacific, U.S. partners in the Middle East are now being incentivized to make their own arrangements. Uncle Sam has other priorities to attend to, and leaders are concluding they need to adapt to changing circumstances instead of depend on the U.S. to do its bidding.

Without overstating the case, U.S. military disengagement is serving the Middle East quite well. It's also slowly extricating the U.S. from a region which, frankly put, is not as strategically important to U.S. security and prosperity interests as it was during the Cold War.

Of course, we shouldn't overstate the case. There are still roughly 45,000-65,000 U.S. troops stationed in the Middle East, down from a peak of 90,000 in early 2020. The U.S. possesses a sizable constellation of bases throughout the region, with one, the al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, hosting approximately 10,000 U.S. servicemembers, air platforms and the regional headquarters of U.S. Central Command. A U.S. carrier strike group frequently traverses the waters of the Persian Gulf, and the U.S. has a habit of flying B-52 and B-1 bombers to demonstrate a presence.

Even so, numbers don't lie. There has been a reduction in the U.S. force posture in the Middle East, even if it isn't yet accompanied by a change in underlying strategy as some would like. U.S. policymakers are starting to see the aftereffects of this reduction, and it just so happens that one of the byproducts is a growing interest among Middle Eastern governments in the peaceful resolution of disputes.

Biden’s stagflation is coming

The White House continues to insist that inflation will soon fade away and the country will return to its pre-pandemic prosperity. But the Biden administration’s regulatory agenda virtually ensures that the post-pandemic economy will be nothing like it was before. The mounting regulatory burden of Mr. Biden’s executive orders, his regulators’ open hostility toward America’s economic system, and the return to Progressive-era antitrust enforcement will stifle growth. All the ingredients will be present to turn the current inflation into stagflation.

America’s experience with regulatory excess is both recent and painful. When the subprime recession ended in mid-2009, economists predicted a strong recovery. In early 2010 the Office of Management and Budget projected 3.7% average real gross domestic product growth through 2016, the Congressional Budget Office estimated 3.3% growth for the same period and the Federal Reserve expected 3.5% to 4% through 2014. Instead, GDP growth slumped to an 80-year low of 2.1% during the 2010-16 recovery.

Democrats claimed the nation suffered from secular stagnation. But when subsequent deregulation and tax cuts revived the economy and the Biden administration needed justification for more stimulus spending, Democrats suddenly decided that Mr. Obama had stopped stimulating the economy too soon. While federal spending in 2009 hit the then-postwar high of 24.4% of gross domestic product, the 23.3% in 2010 and 23.4% in 2011 were the second and third highest postwar levels. By 2012, some 3½ years after the recession ended, federal spending was still 22% of GDP, then the fourth-highest postwar level.

Soaring spending and massive monetary accommodation couldn’t offset Mr. Obama’s stifling regulatory burden. While ObamaCare’s taxes harmed the economy, the wet blanket of his regulatory burden smothered the recovery, long before the 2013 tax increases.

In imposing ObamaCare, government increasingly dominated the healthcare industry, the green energy agenda hit auto producers and power plants and stifled the domestic energy industry with regulatory actions such as blocking the Keystone pipeline. Large banks were regulated as if they were public utilities, forcing them to replace tellers and loan officers with lawyers and compliance officers. The new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) investigated and harassed mortgage companies, as well as auto and personal lenders, and the Federal Communications Commission sought to regulate the internet as a 1930s monopoly. With some 279,000 federal regulators churning out more than 650,000 pages in his Federal Registers, Mr. Obama bound the economy in red tape and imposed 50% more costly “major rules” than had ever been issued.

Despite strong private investment levels during the Obama era, labor productivity—the mother’s milk of wage gains—averaged less than half the growth of the previous 20 years. The problem was business “investment” was made to meet regulatory requirements, rather than to increase efficiency and expand the productivity of the economy.

During the first days of the Biden administration, the cold dead hand of government regulation reached further than it had during the Obama years. Initial executive orders eviscerated cost-benefit analysis as the basis for regulatory policy by defining benefits to include “social welfare, racial justice, environmental stewardship, human dignity, equity and the interests of future generations.” Executive orders opposed business mergers and acquisitions independent of consumer benefit and targeted the oil and gas industry for extinction.

In seeking to reregulate railroads, Mr. Biden is trying to overturn the deregulatory legacy of President Carter and Sen. Ted Kennedy, whose achievements made the American transportation system the most efficient in the world and cut the cost of moving people and shipping goods in half. In antitrust enforcement Mr. Biden seeks to reverse almost a half century of bipartisan reform that junked Progressive-era regulations and profoundly expanded productivity, especially in transportation and high-tech communications.

Nowhere is the Biden administration’s radical regulatory agenda more evident than in his appointees. President Clinton appointed Larry Summers, Arthur Levitt and Alan Greenspan

to regulate in the consumers’ interest and to grow the economy, not to transform it radically. Mr. Clinton’s regulators and regulatory policy let America prosper.
While Mr. Obama’s regulators stifled business and job creation, Mr. Biden’s are openly hostile to the industries they regulate and to the American economic system. They seek not to protect investors and consumers but to make business serve government goals.

Lina Khan, Mr. Biden’s Federal Trade Commission chair, rejects the long-held consumer-benefit standard for antitrust action. She has called for breaking up leading tech firms simply because “big is bad,” despite no evidence of consumer harm. When consumer benefit is no longer the test of antitrust policy, consumer restitution is no longer the remedy. Threatening breakups, divestment and treble damages rather than enforcing the nation’s antitrust laws, the FTC can shake down business and exercise control over America’s most successful firms. U.S. tech policy now mimics the Chinese antitrust model where only government should be large and influential.

Mr. Biden’s CFPB chair, Rohit Chopra, hopes to hunt down big tech, forgive student loans and promote equity and diversity. Mr. Biden’s Securities and Exchange Commission chair, Gary Gensler, wants to compel private wealth to serve public goals such as fighting climate change and advancing social justice rather than protecting and promoting investors’ interests. And while President Biden’s nominee for comptroller of the currency, Saule Omarova, withdrew because of her Soviet-era ideology, he is now considering Richard Cordray

as vice chairman of the Federal Reserve for banking supervision. Mr. Cordray’s only experience in banking was harassing, politicizing and intimidating those he regulated as Mr. Obama’s CFPB chairman.
Through Mr. Biden’s executive orders and regulatory policy the American economy is being transformed from the great colossus of world capitalism into a subservient Vichy capitalism, whose master is government and not the consumer. We aren’t in Kansas anymore.

If the regulatory stagnation of the Obama era is repeated by a doubling or tripling down on Obama-era regulatory policy, slowing growth seems destined to follow the current post-pandemic economic surge. If new stimulus spending and monetary accommodation is employed to stimulate sagging growth, that stagnation could easily turn into stagflation.

西媒文章说美国民主制度陷入深渊

1月6日是美国“民主”的潘多拉魔盒，但这只是美国更深更危险的疾病——已经达到惊人水平的美国制度衰落的又一症状体现。水门事件50年后，美国再次跌入谷底，而这次，当时让行政部门享有公信力的各大机构在今天也受到怀疑。媒体不再被信赖，司法机关被视为一种工具而不是仲裁机构，渗透到安全部队里的极端分子人数让人感到越来越不安。

在这种情况下，美国“民主”似乎成了一个空壳。共和党中的最极端派坚决要破坏美国“民主”的基础，以保护最受益者的特权。民主党人比以往任何时候都更加多元化，也更加松散。温和派担心党内出现激进的转变，坚持一些完全过时的正式机制。进步人士对两党领导人的操纵、虚伪和惰性感到失望。

选举舞弊指控最矛盾的地方，正是共和党人在对投票进行最大程度的造假。共和党控制下的州议会提前采取了限制行使投票权的立法措施。这不是什么新鲜事，但这次的强度和力度使选举进程受到严重扭曲的威胁。共和党人担心美国社会的人口发展会使他们降级为次要政治角色。如果可能的话，他们希望在今年重新获得对两院的控制权，并不惜一切代价保住它。

民主党试图通过改革和加强有关投票权的联邦法律来扭转这个剥夺投票权的过程，该法律已被最高法院的裁决部分废除。

通过人口普查管理或重组选区等复杂手段来假造民意，这并非美国独有，但是立法以保护和扩大滥用职权行为，这是尤为无耻和恶毒的。弗吉尼亚大学的一项研究表明，用不了20年，美国30%的人口将控制国会70%的席位。目前，这种不平衡已经存在，只是比例较轻。

除了政治权利，美国在社会共存方面还面对另一个重大失败，即迅速扩大的社会不平等。拜登的社会保护计划因国会中两名民主党参议员的友好抨击而陷入僵局，令其执政举步维艰。进步人士指责拜登缺乏揭露这两个叛徒的勇气，事实上，他们从未相信过这位过分执着于有缺陷规则的总统。

入主白宫一年后，拜登恢复所谓“全面民主”的承诺似乎成了一种讽刺。美国的深渊正变得越来越深，越来越险恶。